We study selfish routing in ring networks with respect to minimizing the maximum latency. Our main result is an establishement of constant bounds on the price of stability (PoS) for routing unsplittable flows with linear latency. We show that the PoS is at most 6.83, which reduces to 4.57 when the linear latency functions are homogeneous. We also show the existence of a (54,1)-approximate Nash equilibrium. Additionally we address some algorithmic issues for computing an approximate Nash equilibrium.
latency experienced by traffic from s i to t i (i.e., by user i), and use
(1.1)
to denote the maximum latency experienced by all network traffic. We call M i (f ) the maximum latency of user i (w.r.t. f ) and M (f ) the maximum latency of the network or overall traffic. A selfish routing model is then specified by a triple (G, (s i , t i ) k i=1 , l), and it captures the setting where each user wishes to minimize his own maximum latency while the network designer (for social welfare) aims at minimizing the maximum latency of the network. Note that selfish routing is naturally generalized to weighted selfish routing which requires that the amount of flow routed from s i to t i be a given integer d i , i = 1, 2, . . . , k, in stead of just one unit as in (unweighted) selfish routing.
A network game/routing is said atomic if there are finitely many players, each controlling a non-negligible amount of flow (in unweighted setting, that is one unit). An atomic routing is unsplittable if every player must route his flow along a single path [3, 6, 12, 19] ; it is splittable if players are permitted to route their flow fractionally [7] . In contrast, a network game/routing is said nonatomic if every player controls a negligible portion of the overall traffic so that the actions of a single individual have negligible impact on the latency caused by others.
Related results
The selfish routing model falls within the general framework of congestion game [17] , which has the fundamental property that a Nash equilibrium always exists in pure strategies. On the other hand, it has been shown that finding a Nash equilibrium for multi-commodity congestion games is PLS -complete [10] , though a pseudo-polynomial-time algorithm is available for computing a Nash equilibrium in any atomic congestion game with linear latency functions [12] .
When the maximum latency is to be minimized, the PoA of atomic congestion games with linear latency is 2.5 in single-commodity networks, but it explodes to Θ( √ k) in multi-commodity networks [6] . Analogously, for nonatomic weighted selfish routing with linear latency, recent work by Correa et al. [8] has shown the existence of an optimal flow in single-commodity network that is "fair". (Remark: "fairness" does not necessarily imply "equilibrium" though they do bear much similarity). They also proved that it is NP-hard to find an optimal flow in singlecommodity networks, and that the PoS can be unbounded in multi-source-single-sink networks.
The PoA and PoS depend not only on the game itself, but also on the definition of the social (or system) objective. Previous works in [19, 18, 3, 6] have quantified how much the average latency of traffic at a Nash equilibrium can exceed that of an optimal solution. Roughgarden [18] proved that, as far as average latency is concerned with nonatomic players, it is actually the class of allowable latency functions, not the specific topology of the network, that determines the PoA.
Recently, Busch and Magdon-Ismail [5] studied atomic unsplittable network game/routing from a bottleneck point of view, where players choose a path with the objective of minimizing the maximum congestion along the edges of their path; and the social cost is the global maximum congestion over all links in the network. They showed that the PoS = 1 and PoA = O( + log n),
where is the length of the longest path in the player strategy sets, and n is the size of the network. The bottleneck objective for nonatomic routing was discussed in [8] with emphasis on its difference from maximum/average latency objective.
Our contributions and their significance
We focus on the problem of selfish unsplittable routing in ring networks with atomic players and linear latency, which we refer to as Selfish Ring Routing (SRR). We prove that the PoS of the SRR problem is at most 6.83 and is at most 4.57 if the linear latency functions are homogenous.
On the other hand, we show that there exists an optimal solution which is a 54-approximate Nash equilibrium. Our theoretical results lead to pseudo-polynomial time algorithms for finding solutions of good balance between efficiency and stability.
The vast majority of the work on bounding the PoA and PoS in routing games has been focused on the criterion of the average latency of all players and on that of the maximum latency for single-commodity networks, with very few results for multi-commodity networks [3, 16] , which we study in this paper. Our work on ring topology breaks previous restriction to parallel-link networks or layered networks [14, 9, 12] .
Our bounds on the PoA and PoS for ring routing are constants, independent of the network size and the number of players, which stands in contrast to the unbounded PoA for general networks [21, 8] with nonatomic players. Based on an elegant example in [21] , we further exhibit below a complementary example, which shows unbounded PoS in general atomic unsplittable routing with linear latency.
In the selfish routing instance (G, (
The latency function on the top link e j (resp. bottom link e j ) from u j to v j , j = 1, 2, . . . , h, is l e j (f e j ) = hf e j (resp. l e j (f e j ) = f e j ). All the other links have zero latency. Evidently, the minimum maximum latency h 2 is realized by the optimal flow f * in which one unit of flow between s 1 and t 1 is routed along the top links, and h 3 units of flow between s and t is divided evenly between h paths, su j v j t, going through the bottom link e j , j = 1, 2, . . . , h. Let f be any Nash flow. It is easily seen that the flow between s and t does not go through the link from v j to u j+1 to avoid unnecessary additional latency and hence f v j u j+1 = 1 for any j = 1, 2, . . . , h − 1. Suppose first that f su j ≤ h 2 − 2 for some j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , h}. Then flow conservation implies that (i) either f e j < h − 1 or f e j < h(h − 1) and (ii) f su j ≥ h 2 + 2 for some j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , h} − {j}. From (ii) we conclude that, between s and t, either at least 1 h+1 (h 2 + 2) > h − 1 units of flow is routed through e j , or at least h h+1 (h 2 + 2) > h(h − 1) units of flow is routed through e j , which implies that M i (f ) > h(h−1) for some i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , k}. It follows from (i) that player i could reduce his own latency to a value no more than h(h − 1) by unilaterally changing his strategy to the path su j v j t, which goes through e j if f e j < h − 1 and through e j if f e j < h(h − 1). This contradicts the fact that f is a Nash flow. Therefore, f su j ≥ h 2 − 1 for all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , h}. This together with flow conservation makes impossible, for any j , either f e j < h − 1 or f e j < h(h − 1), since otherwise some player would benefit by switching his own flow from e j to e j ) or vise versa. Our results demonstrate salient difference between the selfish routing for minimum maximum latency and that for minimum average/total latency in that network topology does play an important role for the former, while makes almost no difference in the latter.
Paper organization
After preliminaries in Section 2, we present in Sections 3 and 4 some upper bounds on PoS and PoA of the SRR problem and the extent to which an optimal solution can be close to the Nash equilibrium. We then discuss in Section 5 algorithmic issues of finding efficient and stable solutions of the SRR problem. We conclude the paper in Section 6 with remarks on future research.
Preliminaries
Selfish ring routing with linear latency. As the name suggested, the underlying network of the selfish ring routing (SRR) model is a ring R = (V, E) which is a (undirected) cycle in terminology of graph theory (see Figure 2 (a) for an illustration, where
The ring size is defined as |V | = n. For any two ordered nodes u, v ∈ V , we denote by R [u, v] the clockwise path in R between u, v, and set
let x be a node or edge on P , we write x ∈ P , or x ∈ V (P ) or x ∈ E(P ) to avoid confusion. 
, where each user i has communication request for routing one unit of flow from his source s i ∈ V to his destination t i ∈ V , and his strategy set P i consists of two link-disjoint s i -t i paths P i andP i in R, satisfying P i ∪P i = R.
For convenience, letP i = P i , i = 1, 2, . . . , k. Given feasible (unsplittable) flow f ∈ {0, 1} P with
view of the correspondence between f ∈ {0, 1} P and user strategies adopted for the SRR on (R, (
, we abuse the notation slightly by writing f = {Q 1 , Q 2 , . . . , Q k } with the understanding that, for each i = 1, 2, . . . , k, Q i ∈ {P i ,P i }, f (Q i ) = 1 and the one unit of flow requested by user i is routed along Q i .
The latency l e (·) of each link e ∈ E is always assumed to be linear in the link load f e which equals the number of paths in {Q 1 , Q 2 , . . . , Q k } each going through e. More precisely, for all e ∈ E, l e (f e ) = a e f e + b e , where a e and b e are nonnegative reals. The latency l is said to be homogenous if all b e = 0. For any path P in R, possibly P = R, define
We write
We say that user i adopts the short path strategy if ||Q i || a ≤ ||Q i || a and the long path strategy otherwise.
Recall that, in the SRR, users are non-cooperative and each user i wishes to minimize his own maximum latency M i (f ) in feasible flow f with no regard to the global optimum. We denote by f the set of users i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} with
Nash equilibria. A Nash equilibrium is characterized by the property that no user has the incentive to change his strategy unilaterally. Recall that, as a congestion game, selfish ring routing always allows for a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. We say that a feasible flow
. . , Q k } for SRR is at Nash equilibrium or simply call it a Nash (flow) if the following inequality holds true for every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}
For real number α ≥ 1, flow f is called an α-approximate Nash flow if the following inequality holds true for every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} and P ∈ P i with f P > 0
If, in addition, for real number β ≥ 1, the maximum latency M (f ) of f is at most β times the maximum latency OPT achieved by an optimum flow/routing, i.e., M (f ) ≤ βOPT, then f is called an (α, β)-approximate Nash (flow).
Let F be the set of Nash flows for the SRR on (R, (
The price of anarchy (PoA) and the price of stability (PoS) of the SRR instance is given respectively by
Correspondingly, the PoA (resp. PoS) of the SRR problem is set to be the maximum of
, where x ∈ R + . For i = 1, 2, let Q i be the clockwise path in R from s i to t i . It is easily checked that both f * = {Q 1 , Q 2 } and f = {Q 1 ,Q 2 } are Nash flows, and f * is an optimum flow for the SRR instance. Hence Figure 2 (c), via enumeration of all four feasible flows, we see that its optimal flow f * = {s 1 s 2 t 1 , s 2 t 1 t 2 } has maximum latency M (f * ) = 3.5 while its unique Nash flow f = {s 1 s 2 t 1 , s 2 s 1 t 2 } has M (f ) = 4. Hence the PoA and PoS of this instance both equal to 8/7.
The main purpose of the next two sections is to bound from above α and β on any (α, β)-approximate Nash flow for the SRR problem. Our analysis leads to constant bounds of (1,6.83) and (54,1), providing indication of the worst-case performance of inefficiency of Nash equilibria and instability of the optimal solutions, respectively.
Inefficiency of Nash equilibria
The main result of this section is the following upper bounds on the PoS. In terms of (α, β) approximation, we bound β while keeping α = 1.
Theorem 1 The price of stability of the SRR is at most 6.83 and is at most 4.57 if the linear latency functions are homogenous.
To avoid triviality, we assume in our analysis that there exists an optimal flow f * =
that is not a Nash flow. Therefore some user i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} can benefit from unilaterally changing his strategy provided strategies of other users remain the same, which implies that the SRR has a feasible flow f =
where the equality is directly based on the definition of new flow f . Therefore,
Let f be an arbitrary Nash flow. Suppose, without loss of generality, that users 1, 2, . . . , k are ordered such that for some 1
By (2.2), we have
Similarly,
It is instant from (3.3)-(3.5) and (1.1) that 6) and from which, along with (3.2), we obtain
In what follows, we break the proof of Theorem 1 into two lemmas: the first deals with homogeneous latency case, whose proof technique is then extended to establishing the second lemma dealing with the general linear latency case.
Lemma 1 Given any SRR instance with homogeneous linear latency functions, either every optimal flow is a Nash flow, or the price of anarchy of the instance is at most
Proof. For homogeneous linear latency functions, we have ||·|| = ||·|| a . Without loss of generality
by (3.1) and we are done.) By (3.2), ||Q 1 || = γ||Q 1 || implies
Due to homogeneous linearity of the latency function, we have
, from which we can bound l R (f ) as follows depending on the value of i in inequality
If i > j, we can similarly obtain
Therefore, from the above analysis and (3.6), we derive
To prove the lemma, we can assume γ ≥ γ 0 thanks to (3.9) . Recall the assumption that
It is easy to see that the ring load l R (f * ) with respect to the optimal flow f * has the following lower bound:
Among all users whose strategies contribute to l Q 1 (f ), some adopt short path strategies and their contributions sum up to c s , while the others adopt long path strategies and their contributions sum up to c l . In other words,
. Hence by (3.1), we have
Let us consider an arbitrary user whose strategy, path P , contributes to c l . Recall that ||P || > ||R|| 2 . It can be deduced from (3.8) that
Therefore, the contribution of this user to lQ 1 (f ) is at least γ−1 2 times his contribution to l Q 1 (f ), i.e., to c l . So using (3.11), we get
Therefore, according to (3.7) and (3.8), we have
which, together with (3.9), leads to Proof. If we replace l R (·) by l a R (·) and || · || by || · || a in our above discussions for the case of homogeneous latency functions, then we have l a R (f ) ≤ 2γM (f * ) − (γ − 1)||R|| a , which, together with (3.6) and (3.2), gives an analogue to (3.9):
where the first "≤" is obtained by noticing (3.2) and that
With the same replacement, inequality (3.12) still holds with the adjusted definition of γ. Hence
, which, together with (3.4) and (3.14), leads to
Therefore, according to (3.2), we have
which, together with (3.7) and (3.8) with || · || replaced by || · || a , gives us the following:
which, combined with (3.13), yields
By the definitions of PoA and PoS, the combination of the above two lemmas implies Theorem 1 immediately.
We conclude this section with better bounds 8/7 ≤ PoS ≤ PoA = 2 for the simplest SRR that has only two non-cooperative users, for which we have the following result.
Theorem 2 The price of anarchy is 2 and the price of stability is at least 8/7 for the SRR
problem with k = 2 users.
Proof. Recall that the SRR instance with homogenous linear latency exhibited in Figure 2 (b)
has PoA at least 2, and that the SRR instance given in Figure 2 (c) has PoS equal to 8/7. By (2.4), it suffices to show PoA ≤ 2.
Let f * = {Q 1 , Q 2 } and f = {Q 1 , Q 2 } be an optimal flow and an arbitrary Nash flow, respectively. We have
By symmetry, it suffices to distinguish among three cases.
Case 1:
Case 3: Q 1 =Q 1 and Q 2 =Q 2 . Therefore l f * (Q i ) ≥ ||Q i || for i = 1, 2, which, together with
Combining the three cases, we deduce from the arbitrariness of f that PoA ≤ 2 as desired.
4 Instability of the optimal
In this section we investigate how close an optimum flow could be to an equilibrium. In terms of (α, β) approximation, we upper bound α while keeping β = 1.
Specifically, we will find an optimal flow that is a 54-approximate Nash flow. Roughly speaking, to achieve this, we define two indices for every flow. Then beginning from an optimal flow, we perform a number of iterations: in each iteration, we change strategies of at most two users so that the resulting flow is optimal and has smaller indices. When we terminate at an optimal flow f * with smallest indices, the optimal flow f * is proved to be a 54-approximate Nash -if not, we should have further iteration to produce optimal flow with even smaller indices.
Let us elaborate the above high-level idea in detailed contradiction argument, and devote the rest of the section to the proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 3
The SRR problem admits a (54, 1)-approximate Nash flow.
We may assume a e + b e > 0 for all e ∈ E in view that shrink of e ∈ E with a e + b e = 0 into one node has no effect on our results. Let the optimal flow f * = {Q 1 , Q 2 , . . . , Q k } be taken such that it has smallest indices, more precisely, the following (Min1) and (Min2) are satisfied:
(Min1) the set f * = {i : i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} and l Q i (f * ) = M (f * )} contains as few elements as possible;
is as small as possible.
We aim to show that f * is a (54, 1)-approximate Nash.
Suppose to the contrary that f * is not 54-approximate. We will deduce contradictions to either (Min1) or (Min2), and therefore establish the theorem. Our proof is justification of a series of claims that lead to our desired contradictions. First, since f * is not 54-approximate, by (2.3) there exists i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k such that
(a e (f * e + 1) + b e ).
So for γ ≥ 18, by (2.2) we have
withQ i and Q j withQ j , we obtain from f * a new flow f such that f e ≤ f * e for all e ∈ E and at least one of these inequalities is strict. It follows that f is also an optimal flow and additionally τ (f ) < τ (f * ), which contradicts our choice of f * according to (Min1) and (Min2). Therefore, we have Figures 3(a) and 3(b) for an illustration). We claim
The first inequality follows directly from the definition of f 1 . We only need to justify the validity of the second inequality. Recall that s i ∈ R[s 1 , t 1 ], we havē
we have
where the last equality is due to (Max1). Therefore, according to (4.1) and Claim 1, 
contradicting Claim 3), which, together with Claim 2, implies that Q 2 intersects with both Q 1 andQ 1 . We may assume, without loss of generality, that s 2 ∈ R(s 1 , t 1 ) and t 2 ∈ R(t 1 , s 1 ) (see
Figures 3(a) and 3(b) for an illustration). Then
where the last inequality is due to Claim 3. Therefore, we have
Claims 3 and 4 directly imply
. . , Q k } from f 1 by changing user 2's strategy (see Figure   3 (c)). It follows that
, and by Claims 3 and 4, we get
Define Q s as the set of paths
Similarly, define Q t as the set of paths
We are to show that Q s ∪ Q t = ∅. But first it is immediate from Claim 2 and the maximality of |E(Q 1 )| and |E(Q 2 )| (stated in (Max1) and (Max2)) that
To see (i), suppose to the contrary that some Q h ∈ Q s contains t g with g ∈ {1, 2}. From The following is directly implied by Claim 6.
Claim 9 For any
as implied by Claim 7, we may We show that
In fact, it is easy to see from the definition of f 3 (see Figure 3( 
, we obtain
where the last inequality is based on Claims 9 and 3. Similarly, since
where the last inequality is based on Claims 9 and 7. Therefore, (4.4) is established. Now let us prove the following final claim.
To see this, let us consider
. From Claim 5 and (4.3), we have
Suppose to the contrary that
From Claims 6 and 5 we obtain In consequence, we deduce from (4.3) that
is an optimal flow, and
and
Using (4.2), Claims 5 and 3, we get τ (f * ) − τ (f 3 ) > 0, which, in combination with (4.5), gives a contradiction to (Min2).
Finding near optimal flow in polynomial time
In order to obtain a good social solution to the SRR problem efficiently, we resort to its splittable counterpart, the splittable selfish ring routing with linear latency (SSRR), by relaxing the unsplittable constraint f ∈ {0, 1} P to splittable one: f ∈ [0, 1] P , and f (P i ) + f (P i ) = 1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , k. Since the latency is linear, l P (f ) can be expressed as a linear combination of
. . , k, finding an optimal solution to the SSRR amounts to solving the following linear program: Minimize y subject to
In polynomial time we can obtain an optimal solution (x * 1 , x * 2 , . . . , x * k , y * ) to the above linear program and, therefore, an optimal flow f * ∈ [0, 1] P to the SSRR with
. . , k, and M (f * ) = y * . We round f * to a feasible atomic unsplittable flowf ∈ {0, 1} P for the SRR problem in such a way thatf (P i ) = 1 iff f (P i ) = x * i ≥ 0.5, i = 1, 2, . . . , k. It is evident that
Finding good Nash in pseudo-polynomial time
Iff obtained above is not a Nash flow, we iteratively change the strategy of a user to reduce the latency he experiences in the current solution and, as easily verified with the potential function technique [17, 15] , we finally reach a Nash flow f with M (f ) ≤ M (f ) in time O(k 3 n 2 max n i=1 {a e i +b e i }) and in time O(k 3 n 2 ) when latency all equal to loads (see also Theorem 1 in [12] ).
Corollary 4 The feasible flow f for the SRR problem computed as above is a (1, β)-approximate
Nash flow with β ≤ 13.66 and β ≤ 9.13 if the linear latency functions are homogenous.
Proof. Iff is a Nash, then it is apparent that β = 2. Otherwise, apply verbatim the arguments in Section 3 withf in place of f * . It follows from (5.1) that β can be no more than twice the PoA stated in Lemmas 1 and 2.
2
Reducing instability of near optimal flow
The proof of Theorem 3 suggests a pseudo-polynomial time approach to "stabilizing" a given optimal flow f * iteratively -changing the strategy of one user or the strategies of two users simultaneously in each iteration such that either fewer users suffer from the maximum latency OPT or the resulting flow has smaller index τ (cf. (Min1) and (Min2) in the proof of Theorem 3).
This approach works onf , which is considered a substitute for f * , and provides a 54-approximate Nash flow f whose maximum latency M (f ) equals M (f ). In consequence, (5.1) asserts that f is a (54, 2)-approximate Nash flow.
To summarize, (α, β)-approximate Nash flow in any given SRR can be constructed in pseudopolynomial time for (α, β) = (1, 13.66) and (α, β) = (54, 2), and for (α, β) = (1, 9.13) for homogenous linear latency.
Concluding remarks
Positive results established in this paper, particularly in Lemma 1, Lemma 2, and Theorem 3, provide us with (α, β)-approximate Nash equilibria for unsplittable selfish ring routing with linear latency. In addition to much room for improvement on bounding α and β, quantitive relations between these two bounds deserve further research efforts. In this paper we have focused on undirected selfish ring routing, challenging issues in its directed counterpart require more and deeper insights into the interplay of users' selfish behaviors and directed ring latency.
Regarding nonatomic/atomic splittable selfish ring routing, it would be tempting to extend our methodology for the atomic unsplittable setting to derive similar results, although the continuous version is more complex than its discrete counterpart.
Roughgarden and Tardos [19] prove that, for general continuous and nondecreasing latency functions, the "average latency" of the routes chosen by selfish network users is no more than the "average latency" incurred by optimally routing twice as much traffic. It would be interesting to see if some analogue (with "maximum latency" in place of "average latency") exists for weighted selfish ring routing to minimize maximum latency.
